Letter to Judge Edward R. Korman
ALTON H. MADDOX, JR.
TELEPHONE: 718-834-9034
FAX: 718-834-1275
16 COURT STREET, SUITE 1901
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11241
September 22, 2006
Chief Judge Edward R. Korman
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York
U.S. Courthouse
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Re: In the Matter of Alton H. Maddox, Jr.
Dear Sir:
I am submitting this application for a reconsideration of an August 28, 2006 Order denying my motion dated August 3, 2005 for reinstatement to practice law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York because the Order represents a marked departure from Local Civil Rule 1.5.
This Order also failed to recognize that a wrongfully-disciplined attorney has a federal remedy under Local Civil Rule 1.5(e) for “good cause shown.” No similar rule exists in the New York Court Rules and Regulations. This omission in New York law is the basis for Maddox v. Prudenti et. al., Docket No. CV5444 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
Chief Judge Jacob Mishler stated, on the record, in September 1990, that I was entitled to a due process hearing before I could be disciplined in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York arising out of summary discipline in New
York. A due process hearing was supposed to have occurred in October 1990. A judicial promise was broken in December 1990.
This required, federal hearing may have shed light on my summary suspension in New York. It would have had to address the propriety of my indefinite suspension from the practice of law in New York, on May 21, 1990, without a hearing. A federal court is not bound by a disciplinary ruling in state court and it must honor the Constitution.
In December 1990, this Court, with Judges Jack Weinstein and Charles P. Sifton, Jr. in dissent, ruled, without precedent, that a federal court must, arbitrarily, follow the dictates of a state court regarding discipline. New York never accorded to me a hearing until several years after my indefinite suspension. Thus, this Court was acting on naked allegations in December 1990.
The August 28, 2006 ruling, denying my motion for reinstatement to practice law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, stated, in pertinent part as follows: “The application is denied because Mr. Maddox is not a member in good standing of the New York bar which is a predicate to admission to the bar of the Eastern District.”
This ruling not only contradicts its practice in similar cases but it also promotes Jim Crow. It also contradicts several Supreme Court cases, under the Fourteenth Amendment, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). This discriminatory ruling against a descendant of enslaved Africans constitutes a badge of slavery and, therefore, violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
Neil E. Wiesner was licensed to practice law in New Jersey after he went to prison for running a drug mill and shooting at his girlfriend with the intent to murder. Although New York State refused to admit him to practice law in its courts, the alleged rule, that an attorney seeking admission to practice law in the Eastern District must first be admitted to practice law in New York, failed to stop this Court from admitting Wiesner to practice law in the Eastern District.
This is blatant racial discrimination. It, particularly, elevates white felons over Black attorneys in addition to Black felons. While Black inmates and felons are litigating in federal courts to secure the right to vote, white felons are being routinely admitted to practice law in state and federal courts. Black felons are also unable to secure public housing. It would be unimaginable for a Black felon to attend law school and, afterwards, expect to practice law in any state.
Wiesner is suing the Appellate Division, First Department for the right to practice law in New York since he is already enjoying the right to practice law in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. His argument puts the cart before the horse and turns the law on its head.
His attorney, in the civil rights actions, is Roland Acevedo who also went from prison to law school. He had been convicted of armed robbery and participating in a police shootout. If he had been in the military, he would have received the Purple Heart for a combat injury.
No Black person, engaged in a police shootout, would ever be allowed to practice law in this country. Mumia Abu-Jamal is still in prison because the federal judiciary refuses to honor his citizenship status. He is not only being treated as an enemy combatant but he is also unable to secure exculpatory evidence or classified information.
These convictions for violent crimes, however, were not enough to prevent the Appellate Division, Second Department from admitting Acevedo to practice law in New York. Acevedo is able to practice law in both state and federal courts. His admission is to the same Court that issued a ruling against me sixteen years ago declaring that I was unfit to practice law in New York because I refused to violate the Code of Professional Responsibility to Rev. Al Sharpton’s detriment.
This intermediate appellate court, in New York, condemned me for competently and zealously representing a fifteen-year-old Black girl, Tawana Brawley. She had been abducted and raped by white law enforcement officials in Dutchess County, New York. I fingered the culprits. I also refused to violate the attorney-client privilege of Rev. Sharpton while I was successfully representing him, pro bono, in a 67-count indictment.
By way of comparison, an innocent inmate will routinely refuse to appear before a parole board to express remorse in exchange for parole. Two recent examples are the Central Park jogger defendants and Alan Newton. The state suppressed exculpatory evidence and proceeded to railroad them. They persevered until they were finally exonerated without judicial assistance.
New York has a statute which permits a defendant to show that matters, extraneous to the trial, undermine the fairness and integrity of a judgment of conviction. These aggrieved defendants chose this remedy. This remedy is unavailable to an attorney who has been wrongfully-disciplined in New York, however.
New York has ruled that this remedy should be unavailable to me to prove my innocence notwithstanding the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, I must appear before the Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts and testify that I falsely accused former Assistant District Attorney Steven A. Pagones of having been involved in the rape and kidnapping of Tawana Brawley.
This issue was fully explored before a judge favorable to Pagones and a jury of his peers in Dutchess County Supreme Court for nine months in 1997-98. The jury verdict stated, in unequivocal language, that I did not defame Steven A. Pagones. He was definitely involved in the kidnapping and rape of Tawana Brawley. New York is unable to live with this verdict. Nonetheless, it is unlawful for a court to attempt to impeach a jury verdict.
New York’s intermediate appellate court is engaged in judicial torture by requiring me to give false testimony before a grievance committee in exchange for my being reinstated to the practice of law in New York. This is contrary to any notions of fundamental fairness and it seeks to suborn perjury.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel also permit me to continue accusing Pagones of these crimes. His attorney told Newsday that Pagones has no legal recourse against me. This means that I was victorious in Dutchess County. Thus, New York’s intermediate appellate court is also demanding that I forfeit rights under the First Amendment.
The Order asserts: “Moreover, it appears that the refusal of the Appellate Division to reinstate Mr. Maddox was not unreasonable.” Since this issue is the present subject of federal litigation in Maddox v. Prudenti, et. al. this language will have the effect of prejudging my claims and influencing a federal judge, assigned to hear the civil rights complaint, to dismiss my civil rights claims.
This ruling is also a marked departure from Rule 1.5(e) of the Local Civil Rules which provides that any attorney who has been precluded from practicing law in the Eastern District may apply in writing to the chief judge, for “good cause shown,” for the lifting of the suspension or preclusion or for reinstatement to the rolls.
Prosecutorial misconduct, including the suppression of exculpatory evidence as classified information, constitutes “good cause shown.” The Appellate Division is demanding that I get on my knees with or without “good cause shown.” This is a required position for slaves and, after the Thirteenth Amendment, it is a badge of slavery.
The Rule adds” “The Chief Judge refer such application to the Committee on Grievances. Reading the four corners of the Order, no evidence exists that the Chief Judge referred my motion to a Committee on Grievances. Instead, the Chief Judge usurped the authority of the Committee on Grievances. This is akin to a judge denying, to an indicted defendant, the right to a jury trial.
The Chief Judge, wittingly or unwittingly, decided the merits of a companion case, Maddox v. Prudenti et. al., without the benefit of any legal papers or any legal arguments. No reason has been given for this summary departure from the law especially since New York lacks a similar rule for the reinstatement of a wrongfully-disciplined attorney.
Except for its wars with the Indians to wrongfully seize their lands, the United States has treated Blacks far worse than it has any of its sworn enemies including foreign terrorists. My father and my uncle served in the U.S. Army during World War Two. They always talked about how the military treated Nazi soldiers better than it did its own Black soldiers.
While I was attending the University of Georgia Law School, the associate dean, who was also a West Point graduate, would always talk about how white cadets traditionally tortured Black cadets. This tradition started with the admission of James Webster Smith to West Point. He was the first Black cadet, admitted to the nation’s oldest military academy soon after the Civil War.
I am certain that former Secretary of State Colin Powell has heard of similar stories. The plight of Blacks soldiers, from mistreatment in the U.S. military, may very well be a motivating factor in his insistence that the Geneva Conventions must apply to terrorists. It should follow that Black soldiers are entitled, at the very least, to the same protections from the U.S. military.
Congress is not only currently engaged in a fierce debate over the propriety of torturing terrorists but also giving them classified information to ensure fair trials. Terrorists are enjoying the right of political representation in Congress even though they lack the right to vote. Black inmates enjoy neither one.
Congress has found no reason to debate the right of a descendant of enslaved Africans to secure classified information concerning a “hoax.” I have had to defend myself in a civilian court without the benefit of viewing the Brawley investigatory file. The Tawana Brawley investigation, according to New York, falls under the rubric of classified information albeit it is tagged a “hoax.” This logic fails the smell test.
It should not follow that a terrorist is entitled to classification information in a military tribunal while a descendant of enslaved Africans, born in the United States, is not entitled to exculpatory information to prove that he has been framed and to identify the perpetrators, who abducted and raped fifteen year-old Tawana Brawley and murdered Harry Crist, Jr., in a civilian court. These disclosures would officially prove my own innocence.
While apparently seeking to influence an adverse decision against plaintiff in Maddox v. Prudenti et. al., the August 28 Order failed to address the ethical conduct of Attorney General Eliot Spitzer who vowed, during his first campaign for attorney general, not to oppose my reinstatement to practice law. Now, he is arguing against my reinstatement to practice law in the Eastern District.
This false promise to Black voters made it possible for him to become New York’s top prosecutor in an election squeaker. The Black vote was crucial for Spitzer and my legal plight was of great concern in the Black community and a key plank in his campaign. These out-of-court statements were false as is evidenced by his appearance in Maddox v. Prudenti, et. al. Coming out of the mouth of a white attorney, these are “white” lies.
When one white attorney makes an accusation against another white attorney, it is unprecedented for a grievance committee to intervene and, afterwards, take sides. Former Bronx prosecutor, Sarah Schall, is suing former public defender, David Feiger, about derogatory terms he allegedly used to describe her in his book “Indefensible: One Lawyer’s Journey Into the Inferno of American Justice.”
This matter will be resolved in civil litigation. There has been no evidence that a grievance committee will intervene and take any disciplinary action against either of the attorneys and certainly not before a civil judgment. White attorneys enjoy First Amendment rights. The Dred Scott Case explains my legal predicament.
For the judicial system to side with Pagones against me shows that racism is still alive and well in the state’s judicial system as is confirmed by a blue ribbon commission’s report in 1991. “A Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities” found that New York’s judicial system is “infested with racism.”
White members of the New York Legislature complained to the Grievance Committee about my pro bono representation of Blacks in racially-motivated cases. Prior to this legislative action, Gov. Mario Cuomo had publicly attacked me for my involvement in racially-motivated cases.
New York State Attorney General Robert Abrams used the Tawana Brawley investigation to end my legal career. He knowingly violated Article 190 of the Criminal Procedure Law to personally write a bogus grand jury report which called for me to be disciplined as an attorney. Since Blacks are apparently viewed as heathens in the federal judiciary, his odious misconduct amounts to only harmless error.
The law prohibits a prosecutor from having any input in writing a grand jury report. The term “hoax” is Abrams’ personal attack on Tawana Brawley. No grand juror called Tawana Brawley’s claim a hoax. State-sponsored defamation and perpetrating a fraud against the public are serious, ethical claims. As a white attorney, who has defamed and railroaded a Black attorney, Abrams is enjoying immunity.
Some members of the Black community suspect that the judicial system is biased. and my legal plight is Exhibit A. Since the blue ribbon commission made its finding in 1991, the federal courts in New York have failed to take any remedial action, despite their obligations under the Reconstruction laws, to protect descendants of enslaved Africans including myself from white supremacy.
History will record Maddox v. Prudenti et. al. as Dred Scott II. The facts and law are clear. This is a simple case of racial discrimination and the enactment of the Black Codes, after the Civil War, was intended to ensure white domination over persons of African ancestry. America is exporting democracy abroad while it is continuing to oppress Blacks in the United States.
Very truly yours,
Alton H. Maddox, Jr.
TELEPHONE: 718-834-9034
FAX: 718-834-1275
16 COURT STREET, SUITE 1901
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11241
September 22, 2006
Chief Judge Edward R. Korman
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York
U.S. Courthouse
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Re: In the Matter of Alton H. Maddox, Jr.
Dear Sir:
I am submitting this application for a reconsideration of an August 28, 2006 Order denying my motion dated August 3, 2005 for reinstatement to practice law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York because the Order represents a marked departure from Local Civil Rule 1.5.
This Order also failed to recognize that a wrongfully-disciplined attorney has a federal remedy under Local Civil Rule 1.5(e) for “good cause shown.” No similar rule exists in the New York Court Rules and Regulations. This omission in New York law is the basis for Maddox v. Prudenti et. al., Docket No. CV5444 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
Chief Judge Jacob Mishler stated, on the record, in September 1990, that I was entitled to a due process hearing before I could be disciplined in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York arising out of summary discipline in New
York. A due process hearing was supposed to have occurred in October 1990. A judicial promise was broken in December 1990.
This required, federal hearing may have shed light on my summary suspension in New York. It would have had to address the propriety of my indefinite suspension from the practice of law in New York, on May 21, 1990, without a hearing. A federal court is not bound by a disciplinary ruling in state court and it must honor the Constitution.
In December 1990, this Court, with Judges Jack Weinstein and Charles P. Sifton, Jr. in dissent, ruled, without precedent, that a federal court must, arbitrarily, follow the dictates of a state court regarding discipline. New York never accorded to me a hearing until several years after my indefinite suspension. Thus, this Court was acting on naked allegations in December 1990.
The August 28, 2006 ruling, denying my motion for reinstatement to practice law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, stated, in pertinent part as follows: “The application is denied because Mr. Maddox is not a member in good standing of the New York bar which is a predicate to admission to the bar of the Eastern District.”
This ruling not only contradicts its practice in similar cases but it also promotes Jim Crow. It also contradicts several Supreme Court cases, under the Fourteenth Amendment, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). This discriminatory ruling against a descendant of enslaved Africans constitutes a badge of slavery and, therefore, violates the Thirteenth Amendment.
Neil E. Wiesner was licensed to practice law in New Jersey after he went to prison for running a drug mill and shooting at his girlfriend with the intent to murder. Although New York State refused to admit him to practice law in its courts, the alleged rule, that an attorney seeking admission to practice law in the Eastern District must first be admitted to practice law in New York, failed to stop this Court from admitting Wiesner to practice law in the Eastern District.
This is blatant racial discrimination. It, particularly, elevates white felons over Black attorneys in addition to Black felons. While Black inmates and felons are litigating in federal courts to secure the right to vote, white felons are being routinely admitted to practice law in state and federal courts. Black felons are also unable to secure public housing. It would be unimaginable for a Black felon to attend law school and, afterwards, expect to practice law in any state.
Wiesner is suing the Appellate Division, First Department for the right to practice law in New York since he is already enjoying the right to practice law in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. His argument puts the cart before the horse and turns the law on its head.
His attorney, in the civil rights actions, is Roland Acevedo who also went from prison to law school. He had been convicted of armed robbery and participating in a police shootout. If he had been in the military, he would have received the Purple Heart for a combat injury.
No Black person, engaged in a police shootout, would ever be allowed to practice law in this country. Mumia Abu-Jamal is still in prison because the federal judiciary refuses to honor his citizenship status. He is not only being treated as an enemy combatant but he is also unable to secure exculpatory evidence or classified information.
These convictions for violent crimes, however, were not enough to prevent the Appellate Division, Second Department from admitting Acevedo to practice law in New York. Acevedo is able to practice law in both state and federal courts. His admission is to the same Court that issued a ruling against me sixteen years ago declaring that I was unfit to practice law in New York because I refused to violate the Code of Professional Responsibility to Rev. Al Sharpton’s detriment.
This intermediate appellate court, in New York, condemned me for competently and zealously representing a fifteen-year-old Black girl, Tawana Brawley. She had been abducted and raped by white law enforcement officials in Dutchess County, New York. I fingered the culprits. I also refused to violate the attorney-client privilege of Rev. Sharpton while I was successfully representing him, pro bono, in a 67-count indictment.
By way of comparison, an innocent inmate will routinely refuse to appear before a parole board to express remorse in exchange for parole. Two recent examples are the Central Park jogger defendants and Alan Newton. The state suppressed exculpatory evidence and proceeded to railroad them. They persevered until they were finally exonerated without judicial assistance.
New York has a statute which permits a defendant to show that matters, extraneous to the trial, undermine the fairness and integrity of a judgment of conviction. These aggrieved defendants chose this remedy. This remedy is unavailable to an attorney who has been wrongfully-disciplined in New York, however.
New York has ruled that this remedy should be unavailable to me to prove my innocence notwithstanding the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, I must appear before the Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts and testify that I falsely accused former Assistant District Attorney Steven A. Pagones of having been involved in the rape and kidnapping of Tawana Brawley.
This issue was fully explored before a judge favorable to Pagones and a jury of his peers in Dutchess County Supreme Court for nine months in 1997-98. The jury verdict stated, in unequivocal language, that I did not defame Steven A. Pagones. He was definitely involved in the kidnapping and rape of Tawana Brawley. New York is unable to live with this verdict. Nonetheless, it is unlawful for a court to attempt to impeach a jury verdict.
New York’s intermediate appellate court is engaged in judicial torture by requiring me to give false testimony before a grievance committee in exchange for my being reinstated to the practice of law in New York. This is contrary to any notions of fundamental fairness and it seeks to suborn perjury.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel also permit me to continue accusing Pagones of these crimes. His attorney told Newsday that Pagones has no legal recourse against me. This means that I was victorious in Dutchess County. Thus, New York’s intermediate appellate court is also demanding that I forfeit rights under the First Amendment.
The Order asserts: “Moreover, it appears that the refusal of the Appellate Division to reinstate Mr. Maddox was not unreasonable.” Since this issue is the present subject of federal litigation in Maddox v. Prudenti, et. al. this language will have the effect of prejudging my claims and influencing a federal judge, assigned to hear the civil rights complaint, to dismiss my civil rights claims.
This ruling is also a marked departure from Rule 1.5(e) of the Local Civil Rules which provides that any attorney who has been precluded from practicing law in the Eastern District may apply in writing to the chief judge, for “good cause shown,” for the lifting of the suspension or preclusion or for reinstatement to the rolls.
Prosecutorial misconduct, including the suppression of exculpatory evidence as classified information, constitutes “good cause shown.” The Appellate Division is demanding that I get on my knees with or without “good cause shown.” This is a required position for slaves and, after the Thirteenth Amendment, it is a badge of slavery.
The Rule adds” “The Chief Judge refer such application to the Committee on Grievances. Reading the four corners of the Order, no evidence exists that the Chief Judge referred my motion to a Committee on Grievances. Instead, the Chief Judge usurped the authority of the Committee on Grievances. This is akin to a judge denying, to an indicted defendant, the right to a jury trial.
The Chief Judge, wittingly or unwittingly, decided the merits of a companion case, Maddox v. Prudenti et. al., without the benefit of any legal papers or any legal arguments. No reason has been given for this summary departure from the law especially since New York lacks a similar rule for the reinstatement of a wrongfully-disciplined attorney.
Except for its wars with the Indians to wrongfully seize their lands, the United States has treated Blacks far worse than it has any of its sworn enemies including foreign terrorists. My father and my uncle served in the U.S. Army during World War Two. They always talked about how the military treated Nazi soldiers better than it did its own Black soldiers.
While I was attending the University of Georgia Law School, the associate dean, who was also a West Point graduate, would always talk about how white cadets traditionally tortured Black cadets. This tradition started with the admission of James Webster Smith to West Point. He was the first Black cadet, admitted to the nation’s oldest military academy soon after the Civil War.
I am certain that former Secretary of State Colin Powell has heard of similar stories. The plight of Blacks soldiers, from mistreatment in the U.S. military, may very well be a motivating factor in his insistence that the Geneva Conventions must apply to terrorists. It should follow that Black soldiers are entitled, at the very least, to the same protections from the U.S. military.
Congress is not only currently engaged in a fierce debate over the propriety of torturing terrorists but also giving them classified information to ensure fair trials. Terrorists are enjoying the right of political representation in Congress even though they lack the right to vote. Black inmates enjoy neither one.
Congress has found no reason to debate the right of a descendant of enslaved Africans to secure classified information concerning a “hoax.” I have had to defend myself in a civilian court without the benefit of viewing the Brawley investigatory file. The Tawana Brawley investigation, according to New York, falls under the rubric of classified information albeit it is tagged a “hoax.” This logic fails the smell test.
It should not follow that a terrorist is entitled to classification information in a military tribunal while a descendant of enslaved Africans, born in the United States, is not entitled to exculpatory information to prove that he has been framed and to identify the perpetrators, who abducted and raped fifteen year-old Tawana Brawley and murdered Harry Crist, Jr., in a civilian court. These disclosures would officially prove my own innocence.
While apparently seeking to influence an adverse decision against plaintiff in Maddox v. Prudenti et. al., the August 28 Order failed to address the ethical conduct of Attorney General Eliot Spitzer who vowed, during his first campaign for attorney general, not to oppose my reinstatement to practice law. Now, he is arguing against my reinstatement to practice law in the Eastern District.
This false promise to Black voters made it possible for him to become New York’s top prosecutor in an election squeaker. The Black vote was crucial for Spitzer and my legal plight was of great concern in the Black community and a key plank in his campaign. These out-of-court statements were false as is evidenced by his appearance in Maddox v. Prudenti, et. al. Coming out of the mouth of a white attorney, these are “white” lies.
When one white attorney makes an accusation against another white attorney, it is unprecedented for a grievance committee to intervene and, afterwards, take sides. Former Bronx prosecutor, Sarah Schall, is suing former public defender, David Feiger, about derogatory terms he allegedly used to describe her in his book “Indefensible: One Lawyer’s Journey Into the Inferno of American Justice.”
This matter will be resolved in civil litigation. There has been no evidence that a grievance committee will intervene and take any disciplinary action against either of the attorneys and certainly not before a civil judgment. White attorneys enjoy First Amendment rights. The Dred Scott Case explains my legal predicament.
For the judicial system to side with Pagones against me shows that racism is still alive and well in the state’s judicial system as is confirmed by a blue ribbon commission’s report in 1991. “A Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities” found that New York’s judicial system is “infested with racism.”
White members of the New York Legislature complained to the Grievance Committee about my pro bono representation of Blacks in racially-motivated cases. Prior to this legislative action, Gov. Mario Cuomo had publicly attacked me for my involvement in racially-motivated cases.
New York State Attorney General Robert Abrams used the Tawana Brawley investigation to end my legal career. He knowingly violated Article 190 of the Criminal Procedure Law to personally write a bogus grand jury report which called for me to be disciplined as an attorney. Since Blacks are apparently viewed as heathens in the federal judiciary, his odious misconduct amounts to only harmless error.
The law prohibits a prosecutor from having any input in writing a grand jury report. The term “hoax” is Abrams’ personal attack on Tawana Brawley. No grand juror called Tawana Brawley’s claim a hoax. State-sponsored defamation and perpetrating a fraud against the public are serious, ethical claims. As a white attorney, who has defamed and railroaded a Black attorney, Abrams is enjoying immunity.
Some members of the Black community suspect that the judicial system is biased. and my legal plight is Exhibit A. Since the blue ribbon commission made its finding in 1991, the federal courts in New York have failed to take any remedial action, despite their obligations under the Reconstruction laws, to protect descendants of enslaved Africans including myself from white supremacy.
History will record Maddox v. Prudenti et. al. as Dred Scott II. The facts and law are clear. This is a simple case of racial discrimination and the enactment of the Black Codes, after the Civil War, was intended to ensure white domination over persons of African ancestry. America is exporting democracy abroad while it is continuing to oppress Blacks in the United States.
Very truly yours,
Alton H. Maddox, Jr.
posted by Attorney Alton Maddox at 10:05 AM
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