Letter To Judge Nina Gershon
ALTON H. MADDOX, JR. TELEPHONE: 718-834-9034
FAX: 718-834-1275
16 COURT STREET, SUITE 1901
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11241
October 27, 2005
Judge Nina Gershon
United States District Court
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Re: Maddox v. Prudenti, et. al. Civ. Action. No. 5444
(E.D.N.Y 2004) (NG (LB)
Dear Judge Gershon:
Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint was not only served untimely but also not in conformity with this Court’s scheduling order made on September 16, 2005. The motion of plaintiff for disqualification of counsel and defendants’ motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were supposed to be served personally on the other party on or before Friday, October 21.
My motion was served personally on the state attorney general’s office on October 21. Defendant’s motion was served by mail and I received it on October 24. There is no motion by defendants for an extension of time and no stipulation for similar relief between the parties. In fact, the state attorney general’s office refused to return my phone calls.
I confirmed the date and manner of service with your Chambers on October 20. I was told again about the necessity of electronic filing of the papers and the need for the state attorney general’s office to file my papers because the Clerk will not issue me a password. The timely filing of my moving papers in this Court is still unknown to me.
I sought to work out the logistics with defendants’ counsel on October 20 and 21 without success. My office had to shut down on Friday afternoon in order for the papers to be served personally. It is too risky for me to have to rely on the state attorney general’s office to file my papers.
No affidavit accompanied the motion. Even Vice-President Dick Chaney had to testify under oath in the Valerie Plame affair. Defendants’ memorandum of law reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “This action arise from the suspension and subsequent disbarment of plaintiff by the Appellate Division.” While I have always stated that defendants were treating me like a disbarred attorney, I never knew, until now, that I had been secretly disbarred from the practice of law for refusing to violate the attorney-client privilege.
This newly-revealed evidence should permit me to amend my civil rights complaint to add new causes of action and to allow for immediate, liberal discovery. Since the state attorney general is wearing two hats –counsel for defendants and complainant in the underlying disciplinary action– it is important that this Court, forthwith, issue an order for an immediate disclosure of disciplinary files concerning myself and all grand jury materials regarding Tawana Brawley. The state attorney general has an ethical obligation to disclose these materials sua sponte.
It is unethical for any attorney to wear two hats in any adversarial proceeding. In addition to the failure of New York to disclose exculpatory materials, the state attorney general, I am suggesting, is involved in conspiracy and obstruction of justice. I have been suspended (disbarred) for more than fifteen years because I still refuse to violate the attorney-client privilege of Rev. Al Sharpton who I was representing pro bono in the trial of a 67-count indictment in Manhattan Supreme Court in 1990.
Of course, this civil rights action is based on a lack of a judicial mechanism, in the discipline of an attorney in New York, to accommodate newly-discovered evidence or prosecutorial misconduct. That being the case, defendants’ claims under Rule 12 of the FRCP are misplaced. Rev. Sharpton is mentioned in my disqualification motion only because the presence of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, in this litigation, taints the adversarial process.
I asked Rev. Sharpton to file an affidavit in this case because of his knowledge of pertinent information which would reveal Spitzer’s personal and conflicting interests. Initially, Rev. Sharpton noted that his busy schedule prevented him from recounting Sharpton-Spitzer conversations about Spitzer’s 1998 political campaign. Sharpton reversed his position and penned an affidavit which refused to discuss Spitzer’s 1998 political campaign and the unlawfulness of my suspension from the practice of law.
Apparently, Rev. Sharpton forgot a letter that he wrote to Prof. Elizabeth Anderson in 2002. Among other things, it shows, at least, one promise that Spitzer made to Sharpton; that is, Spitzer would not oppose my effort to be reinstated to the practice of law. The other Spitzer representations that Sharpton related to me exceed the purview of the Anderson letter. Today, Sharpton is a close Spitzer ally and, therefore, he must be required to submit to an examination in open court. In sum, Sharpton is a hostile witness.
Historically, the only reasonable explanation for my plight is the slave code and not the disciplinary code. My ancestors would have been lynched if they had interfered with any white man raping an enslaved woman of African ancestry. Despite all the platitudes being accorded to my ancestor, Rosa Parks, for removing some of America’s shame, the notion of staying in one’s place is still alive and well, especially, as it relates to interracial sex.
When this Court summarily suspended me from the practice of law in December 1990, I took comfort that Judges Charles P. Sifton and Jack Weinstein dissented on due process grounds. I have appeared before both of them and have respect for their intellect and integrity. Their dissent confirms my belief that I am still being railroaded and that any attempt to successfully sue state judges in federal court is unprecedented for an apparent, disbarred attorney of African ancestry.
Very truly yours,
AHM:sr
cc: Office of New York State
Attorney General
Encs.
Proof of Service on Office of NYS Attorney
General
Overnight Delivery Receipt from
Office of NYS Attorney General
FAX: 718-834-1275
16 COURT STREET, SUITE 1901
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11241
October 27, 2005
Judge Nina Gershon
United States District Court
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Re: Maddox v. Prudenti, et. al. Civ. Action. No. 5444
(E.D.N.Y 2004) (NG (LB)
Dear Judge Gershon:
Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint was not only served untimely but also not in conformity with this Court’s scheduling order made on September 16, 2005. The motion of plaintiff for disqualification of counsel and defendants’ motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were supposed to be served personally on the other party on or before Friday, October 21.
My motion was served personally on the state attorney general’s office on October 21. Defendant’s motion was served by mail and I received it on October 24. There is no motion by defendants for an extension of time and no stipulation for similar relief between the parties. In fact, the state attorney general’s office refused to return my phone calls.
I confirmed the date and manner of service with your Chambers on October 20. I was told again about the necessity of electronic filing of the papers and the need for the state attorney general’s office to file my papers because the Clerk will not issue me a password. The timely filing of my moving papers in this Court is still unknown to me.
I sought to work out the logistics with defendants’ counsel on October 20 and 21 without success. My office had to shut down on Friday afternoon in order for the papers to be served personally. It is too risky for me to have to rely on the state attorney general’s office to file my papers.
No affidavit accompanied the motion. Even Vice-President Dick Chaney had to testify under oath in the Valerie Plame affair. Defendants’ memorandum of law reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “This action arise from the suspension and subsequent disbarment of plaintiff by the Appellate Division.” While I have always stated that defendants were treating me like a disbarred attorney, I never knew, until now, that I had been secretly disbarred from the practice of law for refusing to violate the attorney-client privilege.
This newly-revealed evidence should permit me to amend my civil rights complaint to add new causes of action and to allow for immediate, liberal discovery. Since the state attorney general is wearing two hats –counsel for defendants and complainant in the underlying disciplinary action– it is important that this Court, forthwith, issue an order for an immediate disclosure of disciplinary files concerning myself and all grand jury materials regarding Tawana Brawley. The state attorney general has an ethical obligation to disclose these materials sua sponte.
It is unethical for any attorney to wear two hats in any adversarial proceeding. In addition to the failure of New York to disclose exculpatory materials, the state attorney general, I am suggesting, is involved in conspiracy and obstruction of justice. I have been suspended (disbarred) for more than fifteen years because I still refuse to violate the attorney-client privilege of Rev. Al Sharpton who I was representing pro bono in the trial of a 67-count indictment in Manhattan Supreme Court in 1990.
Of course, this civil rights action is based on a lack of a judicial mechanism, in the discipline of an attorney in New York, to accommodate newly-discovered evidence or prosecutorial misconduct. That being the case, defendants’ claims under Rule 12 of the FRCP are misplaced. Rev. Sharpton is mentioned in my disqualification motion only because the presence of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, in this litigation, taints the adversarial process.
I asked Rev. Sharpton to file an affidavit in this case because of his knowledge of pertinent information which would reveal Spitzer’s personal and conflicting interests. Initially, Rev. Sharpton noted that his busy schedule prevented him from recounting Sharpton-Spitzer conversations about Spitzer’s 1998 political campaign. Sharpton reversed his position and penned an affidavit which refused to discuss Spitzer’s 1998 political campaign and the unlawfulness of my suspension from the practice of law.
Apparently, Rev. Sharpton forgot a letter that he wrote to Prof. Elizabeth Anderson in 2002. Among other things, it shows, at least, one promise that Spitzer made to Sharpton; that is, Spitzer would not oppose my effort to be reinstated to the practice of law. The other Spitzer representations that Sharpton related to me exceed the purview of the Anderson letter. Today, Sharpton is a close Spitzer ally and, therefore, he must be required to submit to an examination in open court. In sum, Sharpton is a hostile witness.
Historically, the only reasonable explanation for my plight is the slave code and not the disciplinary code. My ancestors would have been lynched if they had interfered with any white man raping an enslaved woman of African ancestry. Despite all the platitudes being accorded to my ancestor, Rosa Parks, for removing some of America’s shame, the notion of staying in one’s place is still alive and well, especially, as it relates to interracial sex.
When this Court summarily suspended me from the practice of law in December 1990, I took comfort that Judges Charles P. Sifton and Jack Weinstein dissented on due process grounds. I have appeared before both of them and have respect for their intellect and integrity. Their dissent confirms my belief that I am still being railroaded and that any attempt to successfully sue state judges in federal court is unprecedented for an apparent, disbarred attorney of African ancestry.
Very truly yours,
AHM:sr
cc: Office of New York State
Attorney General
Encs.
Proof of Service on Office of NYS Attorney
General
Overnight Delivery Receipt from
Office of NYS Attorney General

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