Lawyers Under Attack

Lawyers under Attack Lynne F. Stewart is no stranger to controversy. She and the late William Kunstler represented Adam Abdul Akim for a shoot-out with cops in the Bronx. Her representation of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, in a 1995 federal trial involving terrorism charges and continuing after his conviction, has landed her in federal court defending charges that she was participating in terrorism by disseminating messages from her client to third parties. I met Stewart approximately a quarter century ago in the aftermath of the Brink’s bank robbery in Rockland County. Two law enforcement officials died in the shoot-out. I not only represented Chokwe Lumumba in his effort to secure pro hac vice status in New York but also sundry persons relating to the bank robbery in federal grand jury proceedings, extradition proceedings involving a police shoot-out in Queens and habeas corpus proceedings. Stewart was also involved in the bank robbery case like Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass who defended Mumia Abu-Jamal in a post-conviction proceeding in Pennsylvania. The competent and zealous representation of unpopular defendants puts any attorney at great risk since the government maintains that “birds of a feather flock together.” The refusal to sell-out an unpopular defendant puts an attorney in harm’s way. White women were not considered as persons in the eyes of the law even after the Civil War. It was only after the death of Chief Justice Roger Taney in 1864 that Blacks and women had a shot at being admitted to practice before the Supreme Court. Taney had authored the decision in the Dred Scott case. Dr. John Swett, who was also a medical doctor, was admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court on February 1, 1865. On this date, President Abraham Lincoln signed the joint resolution proposing the Thirteenth Amendment. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts moved his application. Afterwards, he was temporarily prevented from leaving Washington, DC because he lacked a “pass.” Swett had also been honored in Congress for his success in the High Court. He was a descendant of enslaved Africans and his instant fame was of no moment to law enforcement officials. See Emancipation by J. Clay Smith, Jr. Charlotte Ray, in 1872, was the first Black woman to receive a law degree and the first Black woman to be admitted to practice law. Only three white women had received law degrees beforehand. Belva Ann Lockwood became the first woman, in 1879, to be admitted to practice law before the Supreme Court. Although she was white, it took a law professor from Howard University to secure her admission. When white women convened a women’s rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York in 1848, Frederick Douglass was the keynote speaker and a staunch advocate for women’s rights. White women had begun to realize that their legal status in the United States mirrored free Blacks if not enslaved Africans. This convention led to the formation of the American Equal Rights Association. In 1869, Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth C. Stanton formed the National Women’s Suffrage Association. After the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, white women unsuccessfully argued that they were also entitled to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court dealt the women’s movement a severe blow in Bradwell v. Illinois in 1873. Illinois refused to admit Myra Bradwell to practice law because of her gender. She employed the Fourteenth Amendment’s clause concerning privileges and immunities without success. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, decided soon after Bradwell, the Supreme Court limited the Fourteenth Amendment to newly-freed, Black males. White women today enjoy far greater rights than descendants of enslaved Africans. Although Stewart, who is white, was indicted for aiding terrorism, she has not been suspended from the practice of law. If convicted, Stewart could reportedly face 35 years behind bars. On the word of a white, state attorney general, I was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for refusing to violate the attorney-client privilege. An indictment is far superior to an unsubstantiated allegation by a state attorney general. My suspension is a badge of slavery. During slavery, no African could disobey a white person even if the white person was acting in bad-faith. Slavery is still in effect and no targeted Black can expect any persistent and courageous support from the slave quarters for fear of white supremacists and House Negroes. No Black leader can disobey white supremacists. The proof is in the pudding. Attorney Chokwe Lumumba has to appear before the Mississippi Supreme Court on December 7, 2004 to defend against an attack by a disciplinary committee that he should be suspended from the practice of law for talking back to a white judge. Slavery is still in effect. Blacks have buried their heads in the sand. A rally will be held at Tougaloo College on December 5 at 5:00 p.m. This is not a direct attack on Lumumba. It is an attack on the right of Blacks to enjoy competent and effective representation and every effort should be made to alert the judicial authorities in Mississippi that Lumumba has unwavering support nationwide. I met Chokwe about 25 years ago and, afterwards, I represented him in Manhattan Federal Court. He was seeking pro hac vice admission to represent Bilal Sunni-Ali in matters arising out of the Brink’s bank robbery case. The federal government opposed his admission on the ground that he was a terrorist and that he would use his position as an officer of the court to aid terrorists. This is exactly the same allegation that has arisen in the Stewart case. Lumumba is an indefatigable fighter for his client. He successfully represented Bilal in Manhattan Federal Court. During the trial, Lumumba perceived the trial judge as being a “village idiot” and said so in open court. Contempt proceedings were lodged against him. That being the case, a disciplinary proceeding is not novel. Competent and zealous lawyers, when representing unpopular defendants, are caught in a Catch-22. If the lawyer’s performance falls short of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the client’s life or liberty is in peril and the lawyer is subject to a disciplinary action. On the other hand, a lawyer whose courtroom performance comports with the Code of Professional Responsibility risks disciplinary action especially since many trial judges act as junior prosecutors and work to convict criminal defendants. Thus, it is better, economically, for defense lawyers to side with judges and prosecutors.